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 NOTE 
Is the Missouri Sales Tax Being Eroded? 
Examining a Conflict Among the Executive, 
Legislative, and Judicial Branches in 
Missouri 
Miss Dianna’s Sch. of Dance, Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, 478 S.W.3d 405 (Mo. 
2016) 
Courtney Lock* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Miss Dianna’s School of Dance, Inc. (“the School”) teaches dance lessons 
and instructs students on various dance techniques.1  The School has been in 
business for forty-three years.2  In January of 2016, the Supreme Court of Mis-
souri determined that it was a place of “amusement, entertainment, or recrea-
tion”3 for purposes of section 144.020.1(2) of the Missouri Revised Statutes.4  
This resulted in the School owing a significant amount of unpaid taxes.5  Over 
time, the State of Missouri has applied several different tests to determine 
whether businesses are considered places of “amusement, entertainment, or 
recreation” for purposes of the statute, which holds businesses liable for sales 
 
* B.A., Rockhurst University, 2015; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of 
Law, 2018; Note and Comment Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2017–2018.  I would like 
to extend a special thank you to Professor Michelle Arnopol Cecil for her constant sup-
port and guidance throughout law school, particularly through the learning, writing, and 
editing process of this Note.  I would also like to thank the entire Missouri Law Review 
staff for their support and guidance in writing this Note. 
 1. Miss Dianna’s Sch. of Dance, Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, 478 S.W.3d 405, 406 
(Mo. 2016) (en banc). 
 2. MISS DIANNA’S SCH. DANCE, https://missdiannas.com (last visited Sept. 22, 
2017). 
 3. Miss Dianna’s Sch. of Dance, 478 S.W.3d at 408. 
 4. This section imposes a sales tax “equivalent to four percent of the amount paid 
for admission and seating accommodations, or fees paid to, or in any place of amuse-
ment, entertainment or recreation, games and athletic events.”  MO. REV. STAT. § 
144.020.1(2) (2016). 
 5. The Director of Revenue determined that Miss Dianna owed sales tax and as-
sessed $73,276.21 in liability for the unpaid tax and interest but later amended the 
amount sought to $28,214.60, plus interest, which were the unpaid taxes from 2010 to 
2012.  Miss Dianna’s Sch. of Dance, 478 S.W.3d at 407. 
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tax.6  The two principle tests are the primary purpose test and the de minimis 
test, which are explored in greater detail in this Note. 
This case and the legislative enactments that followed it raise more ques-
tions than they answer.  While courts struggle to determine the proper scope of 
the statute, the legislative branch recently enacted an amendment excluding 
places of instruction from the scope of section 144.020.7  Although Governor 
Jay W. Nixon vetoed this legislation, the legislature overrode the veto in Sep-
tember of 2016, and the amendment became law on October 14, 2016.8 
This Note examines the Supreme Court of Missouri’s holding in Miss Di-
anna’s School of Dance, Inc. v. Director of Revenue, ascertains the holding’s 
scope in light of recent statutory amendments, and explores whether Missouri 
sales tax is at a precipice going forward.  Part II discusses the facts and holding 
of Miss Dianna’s School of Dance.  Part III explores the Supreme Court of 
Missouri’s fluctuating interpretations of the statute.  Part IV provides an in-
depth analysis of the Supreme Court of Missouri’s reasoning in Miss Dianna’s 
School of Dance and its relevance to the interpretation of the statute going for-
ward, including an examination of Judge George W. Draper III’s dissent.  Fi-
nally, Part V discusses the effect of recent statutory amendments, both on Miss 
Dianna’s School of Dance and on future cases involving amusement, entertain-
ment, and recreation.  This Note argues that both the court’s decision in Miss 
Dianna’s School of Dance and the subsequent statutory amendments to section 
144.020 leave businesses in a more difficult position regarding whether to im-
pose sales tax.  Ultimately, this Note concludes that the future of the Missouri 
sales tax remains in doubt because of the ambiguity of the statutory enactment. 
II.   FACTS AND HOLDING 
The School, located in Kansas City, Missouri, offers dance classes in tap, 
ballet, jazz, acrobats, lyrical, hip-hop, and pom-pon for all ages.9  Prior to being 
audited in 2012, the School did not file any sales tax returns because it does 
not sell retail merchandise.10  Rather, it relied on a 2008 Missouri Department 
of Revenue letter ruling, addressed to a different business,11 stating that fees 
 
 6. See Spudich v. Dir. of Revenue, 745 S.W.2d 677, 681–82 (Mo. 1988) (en 
banc) (applying the de minimis test); Columbia Athletic Club v. Dir. of Revenue, 961 
S.W.2d 806, 809–10 (Mo. 1998) (en banc) (applying the primary purpose test), over-
ruled by Wilson’s Total Fitness Ctr., Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, 38 S.W.3d 424 (Mo. 2001) 
(en banc). 
 7. See § 144.020.1(2). 
 8. Id. 
 9. MISS DIANNA’S SCH. DANCE, supra note 2. 
 10. See Miss Dianna’s Sch. of Dance, 478 S.W.3d at 407. 
 11. A letter ruling is the Department of Revenue’s response to a taxpayer’s request 
for specific information about the tax treatment for that particular taxpayer.  What Is a 
Binding Letter Ruling?, MO. DEP’T REVENUE, http://dor.mo.gov/rulings/search (last 
visited Sept. 22, 2017).  Letter rulings are binding on the Department of Revenue for 
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charged by that business for dance lessons were not subject to sales tax.12  How-
ever, the Director of Revenue determined that the School owed $73,276.21 in 
unpaid taxes and interest.13 
Section 144.020.1(2) of the Missouri Revised Statutes imposes a sales tax 
“equivalent to four percent of the amount paid for admission and seating ac-
commodations, or fees paid to, or in any place of amusement, entertainment or 
recreation, games and athletic events.”14  The School argued that it was not a 
place of amusement, entertainment, or recreation because its main purpose was 
to teach students how to dance and that, therefore, the tax should not apply.15 
Although the School’s website portrayed that the classes involved skill, 
learning, and technique, it also included various statements emphasizing the 
fun and enjoyment that the classes offered.16  The website stated, “We are con-
fident you can find a class that will make you and your family happy!”17  Fur-
ther, the website described various youth classes as “fun classes to add variety 
to your dancer’s week!” and invited adults to “[t]ake a little ‘Me Time’ and 
have some fun with us!”18  It also advertised a tap class where adults “will be 
amazed at how fun and athletic tap exercises can be” and promoted a day camp 
where “dancers will also be doing crafts and decorating their dance camp 
shirts.”19  In addition, at the Administrative Hearing Commission hearing, the 
School’s founder admitted that participants “get recreation” from the dance 
classes and that she wanted the participants to have fun while learning to 
dance.20 
The Administrative Hearing Commission held that the School was subject 
to sales tax under section 144.020.1(2).21  The Commission noted that the en-
tertainment, amusement, and recreation were not a de minimis component of 
the School’s dance lessons and ruled that the School was liable for $23,984.93 
in unpaid taxes.22  The School petitioned to the Supreme Court of Missouri for 
review and challenged the imposition of liability for sales tax.23  The sole issue 
 
the taxpayer to whom the ruling was issued but not for any other taxpayer.  Id.  How-
ever, the letter ruling may provide guidance to another taxpayer.  Id. 
 12. Miss Dianna’s Sch. of Dance, 478 S.W.3d at 407. 
 13. Id. 
 14. MO. REV. STAT. § 144.020.1(2) (2016). 
 15. Miss Dianna’s Sch. of Dance, 478 S.W.3d at 408. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 406.  The website also described the School as “[a] Dance Studio focused 
on performance quality in a fun and family friendly atmosphere.”  Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id.  The other advertisements included: an all-boys class “full of energy, fun, 
and structure,” “a fun dance & tumbling class,” and a musical theater workshop de-
scribed as “a fun way to develop your dance and acting skills.”  Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 407. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
3
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before the Supreme Court of Missouri24 was whether the School was a place of 
“amusement, entertainment, or recreation” for purposes of section 
144.040.1(2), thus subjecting the School to sales tax liability.25  The Supreme 
Court of Missouri held that the School was subject to sales tax under section 
144.020.1(2) because it charged a fee, which was paid in part for “amusement,” 
“entertainment,” and “recreation,” and the amusement or recreational activities 
comprised more than a de minimis portion of the School’s business activities.26 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Section 144.020.1(2) of the Missouri Revised Statutes27 imposes a sales 
tax “equivalent to four percent of the amount paid for admission and seating 
accommodations, or fees paid to, or in any place of amusement, entertainment 
or recreation, games and athletic events.”28  Over time, the Supreme Court of 
Missouri has applied several tests to determine whether a business is subject to 
sales tax under section 144.020.1(2).29  This Part outlines the history of the two 
primary tests used by the court: the de minimis test and the primary purpose 
test. 
 
 24. This petition involved a revenue law of Missouri, so the Supreme Court of 
Missouri had jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3 of the Missouri Constitution, 
which states: 
 
The supreme court shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction in all cases in-
volving the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States, or of a statute or 
provision of the constitution of this state, the construction of the revenue laws 
of this state, the title to any state office and in all cases where the punishment 
imposed is death.  The court of appeals shall have general appellate jurisdiction 
in all cases except those within the exclusive jurisdiction of the supreme court. 
 
MO. CONST. art. V, § 3. 
 25. Miss Dianna’s Sch. of Dance, 478 S.W.3d at 407.  The Supreme Court of Mis-
souri will uphold the Commission’s decision if it is “authorized by law and supported 
by competent and substantial evidence upon the record as a whole unless clearly con-
trary to the reasonable expectations of the General Assembly.”  801 Skinker Boulevard 
Corp. v. Dir. of Revenue, 395 S.W.3d 1, 3–4 (Mo. 2013) (en banc). 
 26. Miss Dianna’s Sch. of Dance, 478 S.W.3d at 409. 
 27. MO. REV. STAT. § 144.020.1 (2016). 
 28. § 144.020.1(2). 
 29. See Spudich v. Dir. of Revenue, 745 S.W.2d 677, 681–82 (Mo. 1988) (en 
banc) (applying the de minimis test); Columbia Athletic Club v. Dir. of Revenue, 961 
S.W.2d 806, 809–10 (Mo. 1998) (en banc) (applying the primary purpose test), over-
ruled by Wilson’s Total Fitness Ctr., Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, 38 S.W.3d 424 (Mo. 2001) 
(en banc). 
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A.  The De Minimis Test as Applied in Spudich 
Prior to 1998, the Supreme Court of Missouri utilized a de minimis test 
when applying section 144.020.1(2).30  Under the de minimis test, the court 
considered three factors to determine whether a business was a place of amuse-
ment, entertainment, or recreation.31  First, the court considered whether the 
manner in which the business held itself out to the public inferred that it was a 
place of amusement, entertainment or recreation.32  Second, the court consid-
ered whether the revenue generated by amusement or recreational activities 
was considered a significant amount.33  Lastly, the court examined whether the 
amusement and recreational activities were pervasive.34 
These three factors originated in Spudich v. Director of Revenue in 
1988.35  In Spudich, Robert Spudich, the plaintiff and sole proprietor of Co-
lumbia Billiard Center and Spudich Supply Co., operated and maintained bil-
liard tables and coin-operated game devices and sold food, beverages, and bil-
liard supplies.36  Although only about twenty-five percent of Spudich’s sales 
were derived from billiard charges and coin-operated amusements, the court 
found that the billiard center was a “place of amusement” within the meaning 
of section 144.020.1(2).37  The conclusion was based, in part, on the fact that 
Spudich portrayed itself as a billiard center and access to the center attracted 
patrons.38 
The court also recognized that a business could have two purposes.39  The 
fact that the majority of Spudich’s sales were from food, beverages, equipment, 
and repair did not preclude the billiard center from being a place of amusement 
and entertainment.40  The court noted that if a place “provides something edi-
fying or educational in addition to enjoyment . . . it is no less a place of amuse-
ment.”41 
However, the court in Spudich noted that each case should be considered 
based on its own specific facts.42  These factors were not exhaustive,43 and 
other factors could be considered to determine whether a place should be 
deemed a place of amusement and subject to sales tax under section 
 
 30. See Spudich, 745 S.W.2d at 682. 
 31. Id. at 681 n.1. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See id. 
 36. Id. at 679. 
 37. Id. at 679, 681. 
 38. Id. at 681. 
 39. Id. at 680. 
 40. Id. at 680–81. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 681 n.1. 
 43. Id. 
5
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144.020.1(2); however, the court did not comment on these other factors and 
did not allude to why it limited its analysis to the above three factors.44 
B.  The Primary Purpose Test 
In 1998, the Supreme Court of Missouri applied the primary purpose test, 
instead of the de minimis test, to determine the applicability of section 
144.020.1(2).45  Under the primary purpose test, section 144.020.1(2) turned 
on the primary purpose of the facility involved: “[i]f the primary purpose of a 
facility is to facilitate diversion or entertainment, then the facility is a place of 
recreation and is subject to assessment of sales tax under section 
144.020.1(2).”46 
In Columbia Athletic Club v. Director of Revenue, the court applied the 
primary purpose test and held that a physical fitness center membership was 
not subject to sales tax.47  Although the Columbia Athletic Club offered activ-
ities such as aerobics, strength training, and nutrition/weight control services, 
it did not offer facilities for tennis, racquetball, basketball, or swimming.48  The 
court held that because the center’s primary purpose was to facilitate exercise 
to provide health benefits, it was not considered a place of “amusement, enter-
tainment, or recreation,” and Columbia Athletic Club therefore was not liable 
for sales tax.49 
The Supreme Court of Missouri did not mention the de minimis test in 
Columbia Athletic Club, and did not indicate its reason for using the primary 
purpose test instead.50  However, its lack of mentioning of the de minimis test 
was not due to oversight, as the court cited to Spudich in the context of applying 
the common dictionary definition of “recreation” and recognizing that a facility 
may have a dual nature.51 
 
 44. See id. 
 45. Columbia Athletic Club v. Dir. of Revenue, 961 S.W.2d 806, 810 (Mo. 1998) 
(en banc), overruled by Wilson’s Total Fitness Ctr., Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, 38 S.W.3d 
424 (Mo. 2001) (en banc). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 811. 
 48. Id. at 810–11.  The court recognized that some aspects of the fitness center, 
such as the background music, televisions in the cardiovascular section, hot tubs, and 
saunas, may be viewed as entertaining activities.  Id. at 811.  However, because the 
primary purpose was clearly to improve health through physical exercise, the diverting 
and entertaining aspects did not convert the entire fitness center into a place of recrea-
tion subject to sales tax.  Id. 
 49. Id. at 809. 
 50. See id. at 806–11. 
 51. See, e.g., id. at 809–10 (“This [c]ourt has previously recognized that a facility 
may have a dual nature in that it provides both recreational and non-recreational bene-
fits.”) (citing Spudich v. Dir. of Revenue, 745 S.W.2d 677, 680–81 (Mo. 1988) (en 
banc)). 
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Chief Justice William Duane Benton wrote a dissenting opinion in which 
he noted: “[i]n Spudich, this Court determined that a business is a place of 
amusement, entertainment or recreation if those activities comprise more than 
a de minimis portion of the business activities of the location.”52  However, 
Chief Justice Benton noted that, although the de minimis test was the correct 
test to apply in these cases, “this [c]ourt need not reexamine or apply the de 
minimis test [in this case] because the Director and [Columbia Athletic Club] 
agree that all or none of the membership fees are subject to tax.”53  According 
to Chief Justice Benton, because exercise is considered recreation, Columbia 
Athletic Club is a place of recreation.54 
Kanakuk-Kanakomo Kamps, Inc. v. Director of Revenue, a Supreme 
Court of Missouri case decided in 1999, also applied the primary purpose test 
set forth in Columbia Athletic Club.55  The Kanakuk-Kanakomo Kamps in-
cluded activities such as soccer, gymnastics, water ziplining, swimming, wall 
climbing, and juggling.56  Kanakuk did not dispute that the games and sports 
offered at its facilities were commonly viewed as recreational, but it asserted 
that the camps were not recreational because their primary purpose was “train-
ing, instruction and lessons in sports activities.”57  However, the Supreme 
Court of Missouri concluded that, although each of the activities at Kanakuk 
“[was] designed to teach Christian principles in addition to improving athletic 
skills,” there was no prevailing educational purpose.58  The court relied on the 
fact that promotional literature did not suggest that extensive time was spent 
on instruction.59  Subsequently, the court held these camps to be places of “rec-
reation, games and athletic events” subject to sales tax.60 
Kanakuk-Kanakomo Kamps, Inc. differs from Columbia Athletic Club in 
one important aspect.61  Unlike in Columbia Athletic Club, where the court 
found “virtually no evidence to refute [taxpayer’s] proof that the primary focus 
of the facility was not recreational,” in Kanakuk-Kanakomo Kamps, Inc., sub-
stantial evidence established that the camps were places of recreation.62  There-
fore, Kanakuk-Kanakomo Kamps, Inc. was not overruled when Columbia Ath-
letic Club was overruled because under practically any test, Kanakuk would be 
 
 52. Id. at 816 (Benton, C.J., dissenting). 
 53. Id. (italics omitted). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Kanakuk-Kanakomo Kamps, Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, 8 S.W.3d 94, 97 (Mo. 
1999) (en banc). 
 56. Id. at 96. 
 57. Id. at 97. 
 58. Id. at 96. 
 59. Id. at 97 
 60. Id. at 95. 
 61. Id. at 98. 
 62. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Colum-
bia Athletic Club v. Dir. of Revenue, 961 S.W.2d 806, 810 (Mo. 1998) (en banc), over-
ruled by Wilson’s Total Fitness Ctr., Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, 38 S.W.3d 424 (Mo. 2001) 
(en banc)). 
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held to be a place of recreation.  Kanakuk-Kanakomo Kamps, Inc. not only 
sheds light on the issue of summer camps in the context of tax law, but it also 
proves that Columbia Athletic Club is not an anomaly.  It shows that Columbia 
Athletic Club was at one point followed as precedent. 
C.  The Reinstated De Minimis Test 
The Supreme Court of Missouri overruled the primary purpose test in 
2001 and reinstated the de minimis test.63  The de minimis test has since been 
applied.64  Rather than considering whether the primary purpose of a business 
is amusement, entertainment, or recreation, courts must now determine 
whether the amusement or recreational activities “comprise more than a de 
minimis portion of the business activities.”65  If so, it is considered a place of 
amusement or recreation under section 144.020.1(2).66 
Wilson’s Total Fitness Center in Wilson’s Total Fitness Center, Inc. v. 
Director of Revenue offered, among other activities, strength, cardiovascular, 
and aerobic training; nutrition and weight control; massages; swimming, bas-
ketball, volleyball, racquetball, and tennis; and personal training by certified 
fitness instructors.67  Wilson’s argued that the primary purpose of its facilities 
was to improve health and fitness through exercise and, thus, it should not be 
liable for sales tax.68  The Director of Revenue argued that the primary purpose 
of Wilson’s activities was recreation and, therefore, Wilson’s should be liable 
for sales tax.69  The Supreme Court of Missouri held that Wilson’s activities 
were recreational for purposes of section 144.020.1(2) and therefore imposed 
sales taxes on the center.70  The court overruled the primary purpose test from 
Columbia Athletic Club because the “fine line between exercise that is primar-
ily focused on health benefits and exercise that is primarily focused on recrea-
tion simply cannot be distinguished in a meaningful and consistent manner.”71  
It applied the de minimis test and held that exercise – both in this case and in 
 
 63. See Wilson’s Total Fitness Ctr., 38 S.W.3d at 426; see also Michael Jaudes 
Fitness Edge, Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, 248 S.W.3d 606, 609 (Mo. 2008) (en banc) (ap-
plying the reinstated de minimis test and noting a probable difference in outcome under 
the primary purpose test); Bolivar Road News, Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, 13 S.W.3d 297, 
300 (Mo. 2000) (en banc) (applying the de minimus test based on regulatory guidance 
from the Director of Revenue). 
 64. See generally Fitness Edge, 248 S.W.3d at 607–09 (applying de minimis test). 
 65. Id. at 609 (italics omitted) (quoting Spudich v. Dir. of Revenue, 745 S.W.2d 
677, 682 (Mo. 1988) (en banc)). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Wilson’s Total Fitness Ctr., 38 S.W.3d at 425. 
 68. Id. at 425–26. 
 69. Id. at 426. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Columbia Athletic Club v. Dir. 
of Revenue, 961 S.W.2d 806, 810 (Mo. 1998) (en banc), overruled by Wilson’s Total 
Fitness Ctr., Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, 38 S.W.3d 424 (Mo. 2001) (en banc)). 
8
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general – was of dual nature and subject to sales tax.72  In reaching this conclu-
sion, the court established that amusement or recreation was inextricably inter-
twined with education.73 
In Michael Jaudes Fitness Edge, Inc. v. Director of Revenue, the Supreme 
Court of Missouri cited to Wilson’s and noted that Wilson’s rejected the “pri-
mary purpose” test.74  The court in Fitness Edge mentioned that the Wilson’s 
court’s reason for rejecting the primary purpose test was that the distinction 
made in Columbia Athletic Club between exercise primarily focused on health 
benefits and exercise primarily focused on recreation was “unworkable in fact” 
because the facilities could not be “distinguished in a meaningful and con-
sistent manner.”75  Accordingly, the court in Fitness Edge followed Wilson’s 
approach and applied the de minimis test.76 
The court in Fitness Edge noted that “a location in which amusement or 
recreational activities comprise more than a de minimis portion of the business 
activities occurring at that location is considered a place of amusement or rec-
reation.”77  The court refused to distinguish a workout facility where clients’ 
workouts were mainly with personal trainers from a facility in which clients 
engaged in self-directed exercise because the distinction could not be made in 
a meaningful and consistent manner.78  The court found that Fitness Edge’s 
clients’ use of its exercise equipment and other amenities was more than de 
minimis; thus, the fitness center was subject to sales tax under section 
144.020.1(2).79 
In Bolivar Road News, Inc. v. Director of Revenue, a business sold books 
and videos but also allowed customers to pay for and watch adult entertainment 
videos at the business location.80  Although the purpose of the video viewing 
was to allow Bolivar’s customers to preview the video before purchasing it, the 
Supreme Court of Missouri held that allowing customers to enter booths to 
view portions of the videos was an “amusement activity.”81  Further, because 
this activity comprised more than a de minimis portion of Bolivar’s business 
activities, Bolivar was subject to sales tax under section 144.020.1(2).82 
 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. See Michael Jaudes Fitness Edge, Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, 248 S.W.3d 606, 
609 (Mo. 2008) (en banc). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. (internal quotation marks and italics omitted) (quoting Spudich v. Dir. of 
Revenue, 745 S.W.2d 677, 682 (Mo. 1988) (en banc)). 
 78. Id. at 610. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Bolivar Rd. News, Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, 13 S.W.3d 297, 299 (Mo. 2000) 
(en banc). 
 81. Id. at 301. 
 82. Id. at 302. 
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The court in Bolivar referenced the three-factor analysis set forth in Spu-
dich.83  The court noted that “[t]he manner in which Bolivar held itself out to 
the public is [a] factor to consider in determining whether Bolivar operated 
places of amusement.”84  The court found that Bolivar held itself out to the 
public as an arcade, which is a place of amusement.85  The “arcade” referred to 
in Bolivar was merely the area where customers went to view forty-five second 
portions of adult videos.86  The court further stated that “the amount of revenue 
generated by an amusement activity and the pervasiveness of the activity are 
relevant in ascertaining the role the amusement activity at issue here played in 
Bolivar’s business enterprises.”87  Approximately forty-six percent of Boli-
var’s business revenues were from the arcade.88  Finally, the court found that 
Bolivar devoted a portion of each business location exclusively to the arcade 
area and advertised the arcade portion of the business.89  These factors led to 
the conclusion that the viewing of portions of the adult videos constituted an 
amusement activity.90 
In 2004, the Supreme Court of Missouri further explored the scope of 
section 144.020.1(2) in Surrey’s on the Plaza, Inc. v. Director of Revenue.91  
Surrey’s operated horse-drawn carriages on the Country Club Plaza of Kansas 
City, a downtown business district that offers shopping, dining, entertainment, 
and cultural events.92  Prior to being audited, Surrey’s did not charge a sales 
tax for carriage rides.93  The Director of Revenue assessed sales tax charges 
against Surrey’s, but Surrey’s challenged this assessment.94  First, Surrey’s as-
serted that it was not a “place of amusement” because the rides followed sev-
eral routes on public streets.95  It further asserted that the tours educated cus-
tomers and therefore should not be taxable.96  However, the court ruled against 
Surrey’s on both grounds.97 
 
 83. Id. at 301. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 299. 
 87. Id. at 301. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 302. 
 91. Surrey’s on the Plaza, Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, 128 S.W.3d 508 (Mo. 2004) (en 
banc). 
 92. Surrey’s, 128 S.W.3d at 509; see COUNTRY CLUB PLAZA, https://countryclub-
plaza.com (last visited Sept. 22, 2017). 
 93. Surrey’s, 128 S.W.3d at 509.  Surrey’s operates pursuant to a city ordinance 
and has a permit to provide tours on fixed routes, previously approved by a city offi-
cial.  Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 510. 
 97. Id. 
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The court held that because Surrey’s “control[led] the location of amuse-
ment and entertainment by directing the carriage through the Plaza . . . . The 
horse-drawn carriages [were] places of amusement [for purposes of] section 
144.020.1(2).”98  Additionally, it concluded that an educational tour was still 
taxable if it provided an aspect of amusement and entertainment.99  Surrey’s 
advertised the business as being amusing and entertaining.100  The court found 
that Surrey’s also “collected fees for ‘amusing’ and ‘entertaining’ carriage 
rides in a place it controlled.”101  Therefore, despite mentioning neither the de 
minimis test nor the primary purpose test, the court determined that sales tax 
should be charged and collected under section 144.020.1(2).102 
D.  Historical Durability of Section 144.020.1(2) 
At the time Miss Dianna’s School of Dance was being decided, section 
144.020.1(2) had not changed for years, although there had been one attempt 
to do so.  In 2014, the Missouri legislature passed legislation that would exempt 
from taxes fees paid to participate in entertainment, recreation, games, and ath-
letic events.103  Under House Bill 1179,104 people would not be charged a sales 
tax when they paid to participate in an activity but would be charged when they 
paid to watch an activity.105  The Senate later approved its own version, but 
Governor Nixon vetoed the provision in June of 2014.106  However, in 2016, 
after the court’s decision in Miss Dianna’s School of Dance, the Senate again 
introduced another bill to amend section 144.020.107  This amendment included 
a provision excluding “places of instruction” from the four percent sales tax 
imposed under section 144.020.108  Although Governor Nixon vetoed this bill, 
the Missouri General Assembly overrode the Governor’s veto on September 
 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id.  The court did not cite to Spudich, but it did apply the de minimis test.  See 
id. at 509–10.  Surrey’s did not object to the de minimis test.  See id. 
 103.  Mo. House Passes Bill Exempting Sales Tax at Gyms, YAHOO! FIN. (Apr. 11, 
2014), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/mo-house-passes-bill-exempting-
141439748.html. 
 104. House members passed the bill 123 to 26.  Id. 
 105. For example, sales tax would not be charged when a person enrolls in dance 
lessons but would be imposed when a person purchases a ticket to watch the dancers 
perform.  Dance classes would qualify for that exemption. 
 106. MO. SENATE, JOURNAL OF THE SENATE 2 (2014), http://www.sen-
ate.mo.gov/14info/Journals/VDay0109101-105.pdf 
 107. SB 1025, MO. SENATE, http://www.sen-
ate.mo.gov/16info/BTS_Web/Actions.aspx?SessionType=R&BillID=26536215 (last 
visited Sept. 22, 2017). 
 108. See id. 
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14, 2016.109  This amendment to section 144.020 became effective on October 
14, 2016.110 
IV.  INSTANT DECISION 
The court in Miss Dianna’s School of Dance split four to three in its de-
cision.111 Judge Zel M. Fischer wrote the majority opinion, which Chief Justice 
Patricia Breckenridge, Judge Paul C. Wilson, and Judge Mary R. Russell 
joined.112  Judge George W. Draper III dissented, and Judge Laura Denvir Stith 
and Judge Richard B. Teitelman joined in Judge Draper’s dissenting opinion.113 
A.  Majority Opinion 
The Supreme Court of Missouri held that there are two elements in find-
ing a transaction taxable under section 144.020.1(2).114  First, there must be a 
fee or charge.115  Second, the fee or charge must be paid to a place of “amuse-
ment, entertainment, or recreation.”116  Because none of the three descriptive 
terms – “amusement,” “entertainment,” and “recreation” – are defined by stat-
ute for the purposes of section 144.020.1(2), the court applied the plain and 
ordinary meaning of the words.117  Amusement means “pleasurable diver-
sion;”118 entertainment is “the act of diverting, amusing, or causing someone’s 
time to pass agreeably;”119 and recreation is interpreted as “a means of getting 
diversion or entertainment.”120  From these definitions, the court concluded that 
a “place of amusement, entertainment or recreation” is one that provides diver-
sion.121 
 
 109. Id.; MO. REV. STAT. § 144.020.1(2) (2016) (“A tax equivalent to four percent 
of the amount paid for admission and seating accommodations, or fees paid to, or in 
any place of amusement, entertainment or recreation, games and athletic events, except 
amounts paid for any instructional class . . . .”) 
 110. § 144.020. 
 111. Miss Dianna’s Sch. of Dance, Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, 478 S.W.3d 405, 405, 
410 (2016) (en banc). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 410. 
 114. Id. at 407–08. 
 115. Id. (citing Michael Jaudes Fitness Edge, Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, 248 S.W.3d 
606, 609 (Mo. 2008) (en banc)). 
 116. Id. (citing Fitness Edge, 248 S.W.3d at 609). 
 117. Id. at 408. 
 118. Id. (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 74 (1993)). 
 119. Id. (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, supra note 
118, at 757). 
 120. Id. (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, supra note 
118, at 1899). 
 121. Id. 
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The School argued that it was not a place of “recreation, amusement, or 
entertainment” for purposes of section 144.020.1(2) and raised two issues be-
fore the Supreme Court of Missouri.122  First, the court considered whether to 
apply the de minimis test or the primary purpose test in determining whether a 
business is considered a place of “amusement, entertainment, or recreation.”123  
Second, because the court chose to apply the de minimis test, the court then 
considered whether amusement, entertainment, and recreation made up more 
than a de minimis component of the business.124 
The instant decision mainly hinged on the test utilized when determining 
whether a business is considered a place of “amusement, entertainment, or rec-
reation.”125  The court could have either continued the trend of the most recent 
cases and applied the de minimis test, or it could have rejected the de minimis 
test and reinstated the primary purpose test set forth in Columbia Athletic 
Club.126  The School argued that its purpose was to teach students how to dance 
– not to amuse, entertain, or provide recreation to students.127  Although this 
would be relevant to the primary purpose test, the court noted that the primary 
purpose test was rejected in 2001 and instead chose to apply the de minimis 
test.128  As a result, the court found the School liable for $23,984.92 in past 
taxes.129 
In applying the de minimis test set forth in Spudich, the court considered 
(1) whether the manner in which the place holds itself out to the public infers 
that it is a place of amusement, entertainment or recreation; (2) whether the 
amount of revenue generated by amusement or recreational activities at the 
place is significant; and (3) how pervasive the amusement and recreational ac-
tivities are.130 
 
 122. Id. at 408–09. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 409. 
 125. See id. at 408; MO. REV. STAT. § 144.020.1(2) (2016). 
 126. See Columbia Athletic Club v. Dir. of Revenue, 961 S.W.2d 806, 809–10 (Mo. 
1998) (en banc), overruled by Wilson’s Total Fitness Ctr., Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, 38 
S.W.3d 424 (Mo. 2001) (en banc). 
 127. Miss Dianna’s Sch. of Dance, 478 S.W.3d at 408. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 407, 410. 
 130. Id. at 408 (citing Spudich v. Dir. of Revenue, 745 S.W.2d 677, 681 n.1 (Mo. 
1988) (en banc)). 
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The School portrayed itself as providing fun and enjoyment.131  Its web-
site and promotional materials emphasized the fun and enjoyment the partici-
pants have when attending the school of dance.132  Further, it used the enjoya-
ble aspect of the classes to its advantage in advertising.133 
Next, the Administrative Hearing Commission found134 that the fees for 
dance classes amounted to nearly two thirds of the School’s gross income for 
2010 to 2011.135  Consequently, nearly two thirds of the School’s income was 
generated by amusement or recreational activities.136  Therefore, the court held 
that under the second factor of the de minimis test, the activities in question 
should be taxed under section 144.020.1(1).137 
Lastly, the court found that the dance classes were the most pervasive of 
the School’s business activities.138  Just as in Fitness Edge where the court re-
fused to distinguish between self-directed exercise and personal trainers,139 the 
court in this case did not distinguish between an instructional dance studio and 
a self-directed dance studio.140  The School only offers dance classes.141  There-
fore, the dance classes are the most pervasive of the School’s business activities 
and exceed the threshold for this aspect of the de minimis test.142 
Additionally, in applying the test from Wilson’s Total Fitness, the court 
noted that the School’s argument that the classes are intended to be educational 
does not in itself prove that it is not a place of recreation and enjoyment.143  
Rather, the enjoyment and recreation can be intertwined with the educational 
aspect of the dancing.144  Because the primary purpose test has been rejected 
 
 131. The School’s website described itself as “[a] Dance studio focused on perfor-
mance quality in a fun and family friendly atmosphere.”  Id. at 406. 
 132. The School’s promotional materials included class descriptions such as “a fun 
dance & tumbling class,” “a fun way to develop your dance and acting skills,” and a 
class “full of energy, fun, and structure.”  Id. 
 133. Advertisements trying to persuade people to join the School included one that 
stated that participants “will be amazed at how fun and athletic tap exercises can be,” 
and one that encouraged people to “[t]ake a little ‘Me Time’ and have some fun with 
us!”  Id. 
 134. Pursuant to the proper standard of review, the Supreme Court of Missouri de-
fers to the Commissions’ findings of fact.  Id. at 407. 
 135. Id. at 409. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id.; see MO. REV. STAT. § 144.020.1(2) (2016). 
 138. Miss Dianna’s Sch. of Dance, 478 S.W.3d at 409. 
 139. See Michael Jaudes Fitness Edge, Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, 248 S.W.3d 606, 
610 (Mo. 2008) (en banc). 
 140. Miss Dianna’s Sch. of Dance, 478 S.W.3d at 409. 
 141. See id. at 406. 
 142. Id. at 409. 
 143. Id. (citing Wilson’s Total Fitness Ctr., Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, 38 S.W.3d 424, 
426 (Mo. 2001) (en banc)). 
 144. Id. 
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and the de minimis test is now applied, the amusement and recreational activi-
ties must only make up more than a de minimis portion of the business in order 
to be taxable under section 144.020.1(2).145 
After considering each of the three factors set forth in Spudich and com-
paring the School’s case to other cases that have applied the de minimis test, 
the Supreme Court of Missouri concluded that the dance classes provided by 
the School are taxable under section 144.020.1(2).146  Amusement or recrea-
tional activities comprise more than a de minimis portion of the School’s busi-
ness activities.147  Therefore, the Commission’s decision was affirmed and the 
School owed $23,984.93 in unpaid taxes.148 
B.  Dissenting Opinion 
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Draper argued that the School was not a 
place of recreation under the sales tax law for several reasons.149  Conse-
quently, he would have reversed the Administrative Hearing Commission’s de-
cision.150 
The majority opinion stated that the decision as to whether amusement 
activities comprise more than a de minimis portion of the business should be 
determined on a case-by-case basis, using the factors set forth in Spudich.151  
However, Judge Draper asserted that the majority did not conduct a complete 
analysis because it considered only the three factors specifically set forth in 
Spudich, even though the Spudich court noted that these factors are not an ex-
haustive list.152  According to the dissent, limiting its consideration to these 
three factors prevented the court from fully analyzing the School’s case and 
correctly determining that the School is a place of recreation for purposes of 
section 144.020.1(2).153 
Judge Draper argued that it is necessary to define “amusement activity” 
and then determine whether such activity took place at the School.154  Judge 
Draper disagreed with the majority opinion, which implied that any kind of 
dancing is an “amusement activity,” no matter the educational value.155  Even 
though a participant may enjoy the endeavor, the determination of whether an 
 
 145. Id. at 408–09; see MO. REV. STAT. § 144.020.1(2) (2016). 
 146. Miss Dianna’s Sch. of Dance, 478 S.W.3d at 409. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 407, 410. 
 149. Id. at 410 (Draper, J., dissenting). 
 150. Id. at 411. 
 151. Id. at 410. 
 152. Id. (citing Spudich v. Dir. of Revenue, 745 S.W.2d 677, 681 n.1 (Mo. 1988) 
(en banc)). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
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activity is “amusing” should be viewed in light of the specific facts of the case 
at hand.156 
Judge Draper noted that unlike the businesses in Bolivar and Wilson’s 
Total Fitness Center, Inc., the School holds itself out to the public as a school 
that instructs participants on techniques of dancing.157  The School does not 
have a participant-directed portion of its business, and participants are at the 
school only when they are enrolled in a class.158  Although the dance classes 
may be marketed as “fun,” Judge Draper concluded that the “entertaining,” 
“amusing,” or “recreational” components of the business were de minimis.159  
Therefore, he would not classify the School as a “place of recreation” under 
section 144.020.1(2) and would reverse the decision of the Administrative 
Hearing Commission.160 
V.  COMMENT 
Unlike federal statutes, Missouri statutes have no legislative history.  As 
a result, Missouri courts have struggled to ascertain the meaning of “amuse-
ment, entertainment, or recreation” within the context of section 144.020.1(2).  
Missouri legislators attempted to amend the Missouri sales tax statute in 2014 
to exempt fees paid to participate in entertainment, recreation, games, and ath-
letic events; however, Governor Nixon vetoed that amendment.161 Conse-
quently, this statute has created a conflict among all three branches of Missouri 
government. 
Less than three weeks after Miss Dianna’s School of Dance was decided, 
the Missouri Senate introduced a bill exempting places of instruction from the 
scope of section 144.020.1(2).162  The bill amended section 144.020.1(2) of the 
Missouri Revised Statutes to state: “A tax equivalent to four percent of the 
amount paid for admission and seating accommodations, or fees paid to, or in 
any place of amusement, entertainment or recreation, games and athletic 
events, except amounts paid for any instructional class.”163  The bill passed in 
both the House and the Senate and was delivered to Governor Nixon on May 
25, 2016.164  But about one month later, Governor Nixon vetoed this bill, as 
well.165  He provided a rebuke of the repeal, suggesting that it was a thinly-
veiled attempt to chip away at the Missouri sales tax and further damage the  
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 411. 
 158. Judge Draper contrasted this with athletic and fitness clubs where patrons can 
get personal training or self-direct their workouts.  Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. MO. SENATE, supra note 106, at 2. 
 162. SB 1025, supra note 107. 
 163. MO. SENATE, SENATE BILL NO. 1025 at 7 (2016), http://www.sen-
ate.mo.gov/16info/pdf-bill/tat/SB1025.pdf; MO. REV. STAT. § 144.020.1(2) (2016). 
 164. SB 1025, supra note 107. 
 165. Id. 
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state’s economy.166  Both houses overrode the governor’s veto on September 
14, 2016, and it became law thirty days later, on October 14, 2016.167 
Although the statute’s repeal seemingly ended the debate with respect to 
the School, the statute raises more questions and leaves taxpayers with more 
uncertainty.  This Part begins by exploring the history of the statutory amend-
ment to section 144.020.1(2).  It then examines the ambiguities remaining after 
the statute’s amendment in October of 2016.  Finally, this Part evaluates the 
repercussions of the amendment on future taxpayers. 
A. The Conflict Between the Legislative and Executive Branches 
In Governor Nixon’s explanation of his veto of the amendment to section 
144.020.1(2), he noted that there is Supreme Court of Missouri precedent ana-
lyzing the scope of section 144.020.168  He stated that Senate Bill No. 1025 was 
an attempt to undermine the law by creating a loophole for entities such as 
dance studios and gyms.169  Further, Nixon noted that the legislature was really 
attempting to “chip away at an area of law that has consistently been applied 
by the Missouri Supreme Court and diligently followed by the department of 
revenue over the course of previous and current administrations.”170  Governor 
Nixon rejected the argument that the provision was necessary to clarify a con-
fusing area of the law, noting that “[e]arlier this year, the Missouri Supreme 
Court . . . made it clear that activities that constitute amusement or recreation 
are subject to the tax under existing law even if there is an instructional com-
ponent.”171  This comment was in reference to Miss Dianna’s School of Dance. 
Governor Nixon also stated that the bill’s “unaccounted-for budgetary 
impact is unsound fiscal policy.”172  He predicted that the statutory amendment, 
which excluded places of instruction from the scope of section 144.020, would 
reduce state revenue by $8 million in 2017.173  Unfortunately, the budget for 
2017 failed to account for this decrease in revenue.174  Finally, Governor Nixon 
noted that Senate Bill No. 1025’s definition of an instructional class was vague 
and would likely generate even more litigation and open the floodgates for 
businesses to urge the legislature to expand this exemption even further.175  As 
Governor Nixon predicted, the statutory amendment created even more uncer-
tainty in the application of section 144.020. 
 
 166. MO. SENATE, JOURNAL OF THE SENATE 2 (2016), http://www.sen-
ate.mo.gov/16info/pdf-jrnl/VDAY01.pdf. 
 167. SB 1025, supra note 107; see § 144.020. 
 168. MO. SENATE, supra note 166, at 2. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
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This legislative enactment was clearly in response to the court’s decision 
in Miss Dianna’s School of Dance.  The quick legislative response proves the 
uncertainty in section 144.020 and its application.  Further, the response proves 
how important this statute is and how its application could affect the state of 
Missouri. 
B. Remaining Ambiguities in the Language and Interpretation of 
the Law 
Missouri sales tax law remains unclear.  Although Spudich promulgated 
factors to be considered to determine whether a place is one of “amusement, 
entertainment, or recreation,” these factors are not exhaustive.  Additionally, 
the scope of what constitutes “entertainment” is unknown.  Finally, the enact-
ment to improve the Missouri sales tax statute has made this area of law even 
more ambiguous. 
1. Other Factors to be Considered to Determine Whether a Place is 
One of “Amusement, Entertainment, or Recreation” 
Although the court in Miss Dianna’s School of Dance applied the three 
specific factors set forth in Spudich to ascertain whether a place is one of 
“amusement, entertainment or recreation,” it did not determine the scope of the 
de minimis test, nor did it add appreciably to the scope and understanding of 
the factors.176  Therefore, it is difficult to predict the effect that this case may 
have on future courts seeking to interpret the statute.  As Judge Draper noted 
in his dissent, the court considered only the three factors specifically set forth 
in Spudich, even though the court in Spudich noted that those factors were not 
exhaustive.177  However, the court in Spudich provided no guidance as to what 
other factors may be considered, and Miss Dianna’s School of Dance did not 
provide any insight as to why it limited its analysis to merely these three factors 
in the Spudich case.  Therefore, even if future courts adhere to the de minimis 
test, the outcomes could still be inconclusive. 
Future courts may consider other factors, such as the correlation between 
the amusing, entertaining, or recreational aspects of the business and the 
amount of business the company draws in.  For example, if only five percent 
of the company’s business would decimate if the amusing, entertaining, or rec-
reational aspects of the business were eliminated, this would show that this 
aspect is a de minimis portion of the business.  If, however, ninety percent of 
the business’s customers would no longer support the business if the amusing, 
entertaining, or recreational aspect were eliminated, this would show that the 
amusement, entertainment, or recreational aspect was more than de minimis. 
 
 176. See Miss Dianna’s Sch. of Dance, Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, 478 S.W.3d 405, 
408 (Mo. 2016) (en banc); Spudich v. Dir. of Revenue, 745 S.W.2d 677, 681 n.1 (Mo. 
1988) (en banc). 
 177. Miss Dianna’s Sch. of Dance, 478 S.W.3d at 410 (Draper, J., dissenting). 
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Another possible factor that courts may consider is how the business 
holds itself out to its customers through advertising.  In Surrey’s on the Plaza, 
Surrey’s advertised the business as being amusing and entertaining and was 
ultimately found to have “collected fees for ‘amusing’ and ‘entertaining’ car-
riage rides in a place it controlled.”178  Therefore, the court determined sales 
tax should be charged and collected under section 144.020.1(2).179  Similarly, 
the School advertised its dance instruction as fun and entertaining.180  Although 
the Supreme Court of Missouri did not explicitly state that advertising was a 
factor in determining the scope of the statute, these two cases seem to add an 
additional factor in determining whether a business is one of “amusement, rec-
reation, or entertainment” for purposes of section 144.020. 
Moreover, Surrey’s on the Plaza is notable because it illustrates the lack 
of clarity with respect to the test used to ascertain the scope of section 
144.020.1(2).  The case also highlights the shortcomings of the law.  While the 
court in Miss Dianna’s School of Dance used the Spudich test as the basis of 
its decision, the court in Surrey’s on the Plaza litigated the same issue and did 
not mention the Spudich test.181  This seems troublesome and reinforces the 
notion that section 144.020.1(2) is broad with little guidance from case law or 
statutes. 
The indefiniteness of section 144.020 raises concern because it leaves 
courts free to expand the statute to include a variety of businesses, and it gives 
businesses no direction.  A standard must be set forth to ensure all businesses 
are treated fairly and equally with respect to sales tax imposition.  It is likely 
that courts will be inconsistent in their application of the rules, which will result 
in unequal treatment of businesses. 
2. The Scope of Entertainment 
The broad definition of entertainment is specifically troublesome when 
determining whether summer day camps should be subject to sales tax.  During 
the school year, school-age children attend school all day, which is generally 
not considered a place of “recreation or amusement.”  However, the issue of 
whether various day camps during the summer are considered places of 
“amusement, entertainment, or recreation” under section 144.020.1(2) is likely 
to arise.  For many children, summer day camps are a place to continue their 
education while their parents work.  Although some day camps are focused 
primarily on providing fun for children, other day camps are intended to be 
educational, such as foreign language or math-based camps.  Despite the edu-
cational nature of these camps, the instructors are likely to add an entertainment 
element to keep children interested. 
 
 178. Surrey’s on the Plaza, Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, 128 S.W.3d 508, 510 (Mo. 
2004) (en banc). 
 179. Id. 
 180. Miss Dianna’s Sch. of Dance, 478 S.W.3d at 406. 
 181. Id. at 408; see Surrey’s, 128 S.W.3d at 509–10. 
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In Kanakuk-Kanakomo Kamps, Inc., the Supreme Court of Missouri ad-
dressed this issue and upheld a sales tax for a summer camp.182  Although this 
case was decided using the primary purpose test set forth in Columbia Athletic 
Club, it sheds light on this issue in the context of summer day camps.183  The 
camps that Kanakuk offers include activities such as soccer, gymnastics, water 
ziplining, swimming, wall climbing, and juggling.184  Although each of the ac-
tivities at Kanakuk “is designed to teach Christian principles in addition to im-
proving athletic skills,” there were no prevailing educational activities.185 
Further, Kanakuk-Kanakomo Kamps, Inc. does not solve the issue of 
whether camps geared toward education – such as foreign language and math 
camps – will be found to be places of amusement or entertainment under sec-
tion 144.020.1(2).  If courts follow Kanakuk-Kanakomo Kamps, Inc., they will 
look to whether recreation is the primary focus of the camp.  However, the 
court in Miss Dianna’s School of Dance determined that in order to designate 
a place as one of amusement, entertainment, or recreation, it must only be 
shown that a de minimis portion of business stems from those aspects.186 
3. The Statutory Amendment 
The legislative amendment to section 144.020, which amends section 
144.020.1(2) to state that “[a] tax equivalent to four percent of the amount paid 
for admission and seating accommodations, or fees paid to, or in any place of 
amusement, entertainment or recreation, games and athletic events, except 
amounts paid for any instructional class,” does not solve this issue of ambigu-
ity.187  Courts must still distinguish between places of “amusement, entertain-
ment, or recreation” and places of instruction.  For example, with respect to 
summer camps, the court must still determine whether each specific summer 
camp is a place of “amusement, entertainment, or recreation” or whether it is a 
place of instruction and therefore not liable for sales tax under section 144.020.  
The legislature did not state what amount of the business must be dedicated to 
instruction for this exception to apply.188  Therefore, just as courts must decide 
which test to apply when determining whether a business is a place of amuse-
ment, entertainment, or recreation, they must now decide which test to apply 
to determine whether a business is a place of instruction under section 144.020.  
The court could decide that if any portion of the business is attributed to in-
struction, the business is deemed a place of instruction.  Alternatively, the court  
 182. Kanakuk-Kanakomo Kamps, Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, 8 S.W.3d 94, 98 (Mo. 
1999) (en banc). 
 183. Columbia Athletic Club v. Dir. of Revenue, 961 S.W.2d 806, 809–10 (Mo. 
1998) (en banc), overruled by Wilson’s Total Fitness Ctr., Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, 38 
S.W.3d 424 (Mo. 2001) (en banc). 
 184. Kanakuk, 8 S.W.3d at 95–96. 
 185. Id. at 96. 
 186. Miss Dianna’s Sch. of Dance, 478 S.W.3d at 408. 
 187. MO. REV. STAT. § 144.020.1(2) (2016). 
 188. Id. 
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could also apply either the de minimis test or the primary purpose test to deter-
mine whether a business is a place of instruction.  This brings the court back to 
the original issues of what test to apply and what factors to consider.  Specifi-
cally, in determining whether a place is one of amusement, entertainment, or 
recreation, the court still considers factors such as advertising, the way the busi-
ness holds itself out to the public, and the revenue derived from amusement or 
entertainment aspects. 
Additionally, if the court finds a business to be a place of instruction, the 
court must decide how to treat this business for sales tax purposes.  Just because 
the recent amendment states that places of instruction are exempt from the four 
percent sales tax under section 144.020 does not necessarily mean that one 
hundred percent of the business’s revenue is exempt.  For example, if a busi-
ness is deemed to be instructional, but amusement, entertainment, or recreation 
make up more than a de minimis portion of the business’s activities, the court 
must determine how much of the business’s revenue is exempt from sales tax 
under the new amendment to section 144.020.  The statutory amendment did 
not address this issue, which is concerning and leaves uncertainty for busi-
nesses going forward.189 
The court has two obvious options in applying section 144.020 to busi-
nesses with dual functions.  First, the court could distinguish between the two 
components of the business, break the business’s activities into two sections, 
and tax only the portion of the business derived from the amusement, enter-
tainment, and recreational activities.  The instructional portion of the business 
would be tax-free under the amended section 144.020. 
The court’s other option is to flip the de minimis test and rule that if more 
than a de minimis portion of the business is attributable to instructional pur-
poses, then all of the business’s revenue will be tax-free.  For example, if the 
court determines that a summer camp with both instructional and entertainment 
aspects has more than a de minimis portion of the camp devoted to instruction, 
then it must decide whether to exempt all of the camp’s revenue from sales tax 
or whether to exempt only the portion related to instruction.190 
Another example of ambiguity arising from the amendment is observed 
in the context of fitness centers, such as the centers in Columbia Athletic Club 
and Fitness Edge.  Courts must determine whether a business constitutes a 
place of instruction and whether to apply a partial tax.  If the court applies a 
partial tax, the court must still decide whether amusement, entertainment, or 
recreation make up more than a de minimis portion of the business’s activities. 
One might suspect that the court would break the fitness center’s business 
into two components (one relating to personal training and instruction and one 
relating to free workouts and sporting activities) and tax the portion of revenues 
 
 189. See § 144.020.1. 
 190. It is important to note that the court could also apply the reverse of the primary 
purpose test in determining whether a business is a place of recreation.  However, this 
Note will only discuss what would happen if the court applied the reverse of the de 
minimis test because this is the test currently being applied in Missouri. 
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attributable to the entertaining or recreational portion.  However, because the 
statute is ambiguous as to this issue, the court could hold that all of the fitness 
center’s revenue is tax-free if more than a de minimis portion of the business 
is attributable to instruction.  The court must distinguish between what is rec-
reational and what is instructional.  For example, a group fitness dance class 
may be advertised as fun and enjoyable, but it also could include an instruc-
tional component.  It should not be the court’s role to determine what portion 
of a sixty-dollar class is allocated to instruction and what portion is allocated 
to entertainment. 
C. Repercussions of the Court’s Decision in Miss Dianna’s 
School of Dance and the Recent Statutory Amendment 
If courts continue to limit themselves to the three specific factors set forth 
in Spudich when determining the scope of section 144.020, as they have in 
recent years,191 businesses may be cautious of how they run their day-to-day 
affairs due to the fear of potential additional taxes.  Further, businesses will be 
forced to focus on the three specific factors set forth in Spudich even if other 
factors provide insight that the business is not a place of amusement, entertain-
ment, or recreation under the de minimis test.  Businesses will need to exercise 
caution and apply strict judgment when advertising.  This is troublesome be-
cause it is often beneficial for businesses to provide amusement in an educa-
tional environment and to portray themselves in advertisements as entertaining. 
For example, if a tutoring company is considering how to run its business, 
it may initially wish to establish a “fun” learning environment.  It may install 
a go-cart track at each of its facilities to attract customers.  Each student would 
use the go-cart track once after his or her tutoring session.  The company could 
use this to its advantage in promotional materials.  Under the court’s analysis 
in Miss Dianna’s School of Dance, even if the tutoring facility’s main purpose 
is to teach children and the go-cart tracks are just an incentive to make tutoring 
more fun, the court may find the facility as a place of amusement and enter-
tainment for purposes of section 144.020.1(2).  Miss Dianna’s School of Dance 
could have the negative implication of discouraging companies from improv-
ing their business models. 
Although it may appear that the new amendment to section 144.020 re-
solves this issue, it does not.  The court must still determine what is enough to 
classify the business as a place of instruction.  Next, if there is more than a de 
minimis level of recreational activity, the court may still impose taxes on that 
portion.  Therefore, the factors that the court considers in determining whether 
a place is one of amusement, entertainment, or recreation are relevant.  In ad-
dition to the factors set forth in Spudich, the court may consider other factors, 
such as the amount of time spent on tutoring compared to the amount of time 
 
 191. See Spudich v. Dir. of Revenue, 745 S.W.2d 677, 681 n.1 (Mo. 1988) (en 
banc). 
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spent riding go-carts.  The court would then need to delve into how to apportion 
the facility’s revenue between amusement and instruction. 
Additionally, this decision may affect how businesses advertise.  The 
court considered the business’s advertisements and its website in determining 
whether it was purported to be a place of “amusement” and “entertainment.”192  
However, it is not uncommon for businesses to portray themselves in a positive 
manner to make patrons more excited about the business.  For example, grade 
school, law school, and work can all be “fun,” but this does not categorize those 
as places of recreation, amusement, or entertainment.  Just because a business 
is described as “fun” does not mean it should be required to pay additional 
taxes.  If this factor continues to be a major part of the analysis, businesses may 
change the way they advertise.  If the School would have advertised differently, 
the court may have held in favor it is.  Two businesses that are operated the 
exact same way could be classified differently merely because the wordings of 
their advertisements differ.  Nonetheless, the School still describes its youth 
classes as “fun classes to add variety to your dancer’s week” and its “Mom & 
Me” class as “a fun dance class for both mom and child.”193 
The recent legislative enactment does not solve this issue in the context 
of advertising.  The legislature did not determine if all of a business’s revenue 
would be tax-free when part of the business was related to instructional pur-
poses or if only the portion of revenue attributable to instruction would be tax-
free.  If the court deems that only the portion relating to instruction is tax-free, 
a business’s advertising will still be affected.  For example, if a fitness class is 
advertised as “fun,” the court may still tax the portion of the revenue from the 
fitness class attributable to “recreation” or “entertainment.”  Several activities, 
such as dance or fitness classes, have both an instructional and an entertaining 
aspect.  Therefore, courts must still determine which test to apply and on what 
activities the tax will be imposed. 
Each business has different aspects it focuses on to become successful.  
All businesses want to ensure that customers enjoy their experiences.  Further, 
even if the business’s main goal is to “teach” or “instruct,” the business will 
likely try to make this experience enjoyable.  If the primary purpose test set 
forth in Columbia Athletic Club were applied, businesses would be able to have 
multiple focuses without being punished by way of a sales tax.194  Under this 
test, an instructional business could include aspects of recreation and entertain-
ment but would not be subject to the sales tax so long as the primary purpose 
was instructional.195  Conversely, under the de minimis test, if a particular busi-
ness has one main purpose, but focuses on other factors to develop a successful 
 
 192. Miss Dianna’s Sch. of Dance, Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, 478 S.W.3d 405, 408 
(Mo. 2016) (en banc). 
 193. MISS DIANNA’S SCH. DANCE, supra note 2. 
 194. Columbia Athletic Club v. Dir. of Revenue, 961 S.W.2d 806, 809–10 (Mo. 
1998) (en banc), overruled by Wilson’s Total Fitness Ctr., Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, 38 
S.W.3d 424 (Mo. 2001) (en banc). 
 195. Id. at 810. 
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business, the business can still be taxed according to the other factors.196  As 
long as the “entertaining” or “amusing” element is not a de minimis portion of 
the business, the business can be categorized as such for tax purposes.197  
Therefore, a business that offers piano lessons, soccer lessons, swimming les-
sons, and tutoring may be liable for sales tax if there is an “entertaining” or 
“amusing” factor that makes up more than a de minimis portion of the business.  
Under the new statutory amendment, only the portion of revenue attributable 
to instruction may be tax-exempt. 
The amendment may also discourage businesses from making learning 
enjoyable, which could completely change the nature of the business.  Busi-
nesses have an incentive to offer the best possible services in order to attract 
customers, and if they are taxed for making their businesses “amusing” or “en-
tertaining,” the businesses may instead focus entirely on the teaching aspect of 
their businesses and not on making them fun.  Places of instruction would likely 
suffer financially by not advertising their businesses as entertaining and also 
by actually deciding not to make their businesses entertaining. 
Because the statutory amendment only recently became effective, the Su-
preme Court of Missouri has not yet addressed these issues.  While one cannot 
determine with certainty how the court will rule on these issues, a prediction 
can be made.  It seems that taxing the amusing, entertaining, or recreation por-
tion of the business would be the more fiscally-responsible option for Missouri.  
If the entire business is deemed tax-free, the State of Missouri’s revenue would 
decrease substantially.  Rather, if the court breaks the business into two com-
ponents, the court will achieve its objective of not imposing tax on instructional 
places, while not losing revenue. 
Furthermore, Judge Richard B. Teitelman, who joined in the dissent in 
Miss Dianna’s School of Dance, has since passed away, and Judge W. Brent 
Powell has joined the Supreme Court of Missouri.  This is significant because 
the decision in Miss Dianna’s School of Dance was close – a four to three de-
cision.  Therefore, Judge Teitelman’s death and the change in the court’s com-
position contributes to the existing ambiguity in this area of law, as there is no 
certainty on how Judge Powell will stand on this issue. 
Overall, there is still great uncertainty in the application of section 
144.020.  The questions raised by Miss Dianna’s School of Dance remain un-
answered and even more uncertainty arises.  This uncertainty will influence 
how businesses advertise and operate day-to-day.  Now, businesses will try to 
incorporate instruction, wherever possible, in hopes of falling into the excep-
tion for places of instruction. 
 
 196. See Miss Dianna’s Sch. of Dance, 478 S.W.3d at 407–10; see also Spudich, 
745 S.W.2d at 680–82; Bolivar Rd. News, Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, 13 S.W.3d 297, 
301–02 (Mo. 2000) (en banc); Wilson’s Total Fitness Ctr., 38 S.W.3d at 425–26; Mi-
chael Jaudes Fitness Edge, Inc., v. Dir. of Revenue, 248 S.W.3d 606, 609–10 (Mo. 
2008) (en banc). 
 197. E.g., Miss Dianna’s Sch. of Dance, 478 S.W.3d at 409. 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
The future of the Missouri sales tax, as applied to places of entertainment, 
amusement, and recreation, remains in doubt.  It is possible that the Missouri 
legislature will continue to chip away at the sales tax as predicted by Governor 
Nixon when he vetoed Senate Bill No. 1025.  Whether such legislative actions 
will erode Missouri’s tax base remains to be seen.  In addition, a new legislature 
and new governor, Governor Eric Greitens, may reverse this trend.  What re-
mains certain is that Missouri courts will continue to grapple with the scope of 
section 144.020, especially in light of the Supreme Court of Missouri’s deci-
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